Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
1982

Managing Flood Risk: Technical Uncertainty in the National Flood
Insurance Program
Michael S. Baram
Boston University School of Law

J. Raymond Miyares

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael S. Baram & J. R. Miyares, Managing Flood Risk: Technical Uncertainty in the National Flood
Insurance Program , in 7 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 129 (1982).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/1731

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

Managing Flood Risk:
Technical Uncertainty in
the National Flood Insurance Program*
Michael S. Baram**
J. Raymond Miyares***
The national flood insurance program has been in operation a little more than a decade ....
[T]his is a suitable time to ask how
far it has come toward meeting its objectives, what problems it
has encountered, and what that experience suggests as to its further development....
Of the total number of 1,800,000 policies in force . . . [o]f
the more than 16,500 communities with policies in force ....
[a]
program of $73 billion coverage. . . . is bound to encounter

troublesome questions of policy and operating procedure.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Congress established the National Flood Insurance Program
("NFIP")2 to prevent flood damage and to provide relief after such
damage has occurred. The NFIP is administered by the Federal
* The research forming the basis for this publication was conducted pursuant to a
contract with the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The substance of such
research is dedicated to the public. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency. The authors wish to thank the following
for their cooperation and assistance: Messrs. Arthur Zeizel, William Cumming, Brian
Mrazik, Robert Sokolove, Edward Thomas and John Schiebel .of FEMA; Jerome
Degen and Robert Langen of Anderson-Nichols; and Dr. Willie Vicens of Camp,
Dresser & McKee.
** Partner, Bracken & Baram, Boston; Adjunct Professor of Law, Boston University
Law School; B.S. 1957, Tufts University; L.L.B. 1961, Columbia University.
*** Associate, Bracken & Baram, Boston; Research Associate, Boston University
Law School; S.B. 1971, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D. 1974, University
of Virginia.

1. Flood Insurance and Crime and Riot Reinsurance: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Insurance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1980) (on oversight and the reauthorization of the
three insurance programs) (statement of Dr. Gilbert F. White).
2. The program was established in substantially its present form in the National
Flood Insurance Act of 1968 ("NFIA"), Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2414, 4001-4128 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[7:129

Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA" or "Agency") 3 and has
become a major influence on state and local land use regulation
and a critical factor in private land use decisions across the nation.
This innovative program seeks to control the risk of flood damage
by inducing local government to take land use control and other
"police power" measures. It offers, as the inducement for such
measures, the availability of federal flood insurance at low cost to
property owners within the jurisdiction of the local government.
Community compliance with NFIP requirements establishes the
eligibility of property owners for the benefits of federal insurance
coverage, and thus advances the congressional objective of flood
risk reduction.
This program involves the federal government significantly-but
indirectly-in local land use and private development. Although
the program is highly structured, it is based on incomplete and
changing data as to flood risk potential, and involves the use of analytic methods for predicting flood risk that produce good "estimates" at best. Further, its success depends upon the vigor of local
efforts to control development in flood-prone areas, which will vary
considerably with local values, legal authority and private development pressure. Finally, extra-community developments constitute
an inevitable dynamic condition which lies beyond the control of
FEMA and its member communities, and may dramatically change
the potential flood risk. An upstream development, for example,
may change the flood potential of a river for a number of downstream communities struggling to comply with NFIP requirements.
Nevertheless, Congress chose to provide the benefit 4 of subsidized flood insurance, and has affirmed this decision consistently.
3. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 41,943 (1978), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. app., at 360 (Supp. III 1979), and in 92 Stat. 3788 (1978), established the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The plan was activated effective April 1, 1979.
Executive Order 12,127, 44 Fed. Reg. 19,367 (1979). The plan transferred to FEMA
the functions of the Federal Insurance Administration which had been a part of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. The powers of the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development were transferred to the Director of FEMA.
4. A "benefits" program is one involving a "benefit ....
whether in money or in
kind [such as the availability of insurance coverage], which is made available out of
federal funds or with respect to which a federal agency has assumed the responsibility for determining... entitlement." Mashaw, Quality Assurance Systems in the Adjudication of Claims of Entitlement to Benefits or Compensation, in 3 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 161
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Mashaw]. Cf. Rainbow Valley Citrus Corp. v. Fed. Crop
Ins. Corp., 506 F.2d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1974) ("The Federal Crop Insurance Act does
not create a system of statutory benefits; rather, it authorizes the FCIC to make contracts under certain circumstances.").
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To deal with these and other implementation problems, it vested
the Agency (originally the Department of Housing and Urban Development) with considerable discretion for designing the NFIP
5
and its insurance eligibility requirements.
This article addresses two problems that have emerged under
the NFIP. Both problems are attributable in large part to the technical uncertainties and changing circumstances which beset the
program.
First, the article gauges the bases for rejecting existing flood hazard reports in favor of "restudy." When should a FEMA flood
insurance study ("FIS") of a community's flood risk, insurance availability, floodplain mapping and community compliance requirements be corrected, amended or superseded by a restudy? What
procedures should be employed in making that decision? This is a
problem of growing importance to FEMA, because the FIS is central to FEMA determinations and the availability of insurance, and
the rising demand for restudies claims an increasing share of the
Agency's budget. Indeed, restudies may soon be capturing virtually
6
all study funds to be committed for the NFIP.
Second, the article sets up parameters for the Agency's response
to new technical or methodological developments which promise
greater accuracy in floodplain mapping and predictions of risk. Under what circumstances should FEMA adopt new engineering assumptions and methodologies for its studies and restudies, and
what criteria should the agency employ to make these generically
7
applicable decisions?
5. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 4015(a)(1), 4101, 4102(a) (1976) (authorizing the establishment of premium rates, the identification of flood risk zones, and studies for land
management purposes, respectively).
6. By mid-1981 about 6,500 community FISs had been completed. In addition,
approximately 4,200 communities had FISs in progress, bringing the total number of
communities studied or under study to 10,700. This represents approximately 53% of
the 20,300 communities identified as having special flood hazard areas.
As of May, 1981, 650 communities (10% of the communities with completed FISs)
had been restudied at least once. Ninety-five communities had been restudied two
or more times. FEMA has projected that about 750 restudies will be performed in
1981, and that a similar number of restudies will be required each succeeding year
just to maintain up-to-date information. Anderson-Nichols & Co., Identification of
Promising Approaches, Methods, and Procedures for Performing Riverine Flood Insurance Restudies, Report to the United States Federal Emergency Management
Agency § 1.1 (forthcoming).
7. Both problems involve legal issues as well as issues of cost-effectiveness, technical accuracy and reliability, and efficacy in achieving the congressional objectives.
This analysis focuses on the legal issues, but incorporates some of the technical findings of Anderson-Nichols & Co. Id.
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Although stated as abstract propositions, both issues concern real
property, property owners, development potential and the spectre
of loss of life and property. Intense, local controversies are arising
across the nation over the validity of older FISs still used to justify
restrictions on the development of specific properties. FIS determinations and local compliance measures face challenges and litigation. In the midst of this upheaval, FEMA is actively seeking an
efficacious and cost-effective strategy for its program.
This article identifies the legal framework and technical considerations governing the issues stated and weighs possible solutions.
The findings, while of direct relevance to FEMA, local communities and affected private interests, also should contribute to an improved understanding of federal programs which seek to manage
risk through the provision of benefits.
II.

COMPELLING A RESTUDY OR NEW STUDY METHOD

BY LEGAL PROCESS

A. The Flood Insurance Study
The FIS for a community provides the analytical and evidentiary
basis for risk determinations and all that follows from them: insurance eligibility and rates, actual placement of subsidized insurance,
the claims to be paid for covered damage that occurs, community
controls on facility siting and land use, and the achievement of the
NFIP's risk management objectives. In addition, the FIS provides
data which is later used by other federal, state and local agencies
and private institutions for, among other goals, the provision of disaster assistance, the protection of wetlands, and mortgage financing
for developers. In order to explore the dynamics of restudy, it is
first necessary to consider these uses and to define the legally required characteristics of an FIS.
1. Uses of an FIS
Many of the statutory and regulatory provisions of the NFIP either expressly or implicitly require that the FIS be fit for certain
uses. The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 ("NFIA" or "Act") 8
secures its coordination with the vital function of insurance. 9 Upon
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2414, 4001-4128 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
9. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 4071 (1976), the old NFIP assumed operational responsibility for flood insurance on November 2, 1977. As presently operated, FEMA contracts with a private consultant for certain ministerial functions of the program and
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completion and adoption of the FIS, the Agency establishes insurance rate zones for the community. 10 Thereafter, when the community joins the "regular" flood program, the zones so established

and the flood elevations determined in the study form the basis for
actuarial rate determinations." These rates then apply to all new
12
construction in the community.
Less clearly described in the Act is the use of the FIS in the formulation of land use controls. Local approval of the FIS triggers a
six-month period, established by regulation, during which the community must adopt certain land use measures if its residents are to
enjoy the program's flood insurance benefits. 1 3 The measures are
mandatory only in that they require the community to direct development by and large away from high-risk tracts. The specific implications for a community and its landowners depend in large part
on the measures chosen.
The key features of the required response relate to new construction in the "base flood area"1 4 and in another zone, the
"floodway."' 5 In the base flood area, new construction must be
continues to rely on private insurance agents, brokers and adjustment organizations.
However, FEMA no longer underwrites flood insurance jointly with the privatelyorganized National Flood Insurers Assocation. Rather all flood insurance is publicly
underwritten. For a description of the events leading up to the November 2 decision,
see Nat'l Flood Insurers Ass'n v. Harris, 444 F. Supp. 969 (D.D.C. 1977).
10. 44 C.F.R. § 64.3 (1980).
11. Id.
12. Existing structures will continue to be eligible for subsidized insurance, as
they Were in the "emergency" program. 44 C.F.R. § 64.5 (1980). Flood elevation determinations thus presumably serve as an economic deterrent to any new construction within the boundaries of the base flood. For example, for new structures built
substantially below the base flood elevation, actuarial premiums may be as high as
$25 per $100 coverage. Federal Insurance Administration, Dep't of Housing and
Urban Development, Flood Insurance Manual at app. B (May, 1978) (rate tables).
.13. 44 C.F.R. § 59.24 (1980). The Act requires the adoption of:
adequate state and local measures which, to the maximum extent feasible, will(1) constrict the development of land... exposed to flood damage ....
(2) guide the development of proposed construction away from locations
threatened by flood hazards,
(3) assist in reducing damage caused by floods, and
(4) otherwise improve the long-range land management and use of flood-prone
areas.

42 U.S.C. § 4102 (1976).
14. " 'Base flood' means the flood having a one percent chance of being equalled
or exceeded in any given year." 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (1979).
15. " 'Regulatory floodway' means the channel of a river or other watercourse
and the adjacent land areas that must be reserved in order to discharge the base
flood without cumulatively increasing the water surface elevation more than a designated height." Id.
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above the base flood level.' 6 In the floodway, it is prohibited if the
construction would have the effect of inhibiting the flow of the base
flood's waters. 1 7 Both of these restrictions, and especially the latter
one, are stringent and controversial. Their validity, if challenged,
must rest mainly on the FIS.' 8
Beyond these direct uses of the FIS are several others. Key
among these is mandatory resort to the FIS pursuant to the Water
Resource Council's Guidelines' 9 for Implementing Executive Order 11,988.20 These guidelines require all federal agencies to explain a decision to "conduct, support or allow an action to be lo-

cated in a floodplain." 21 They designate the flood insurance rate

map, a component of an FIS, and the study itself as the primary
sources of information on the base flood area. 22 Thus, virtually any
federal participation in "an action to be located in the floodplain"
might be held to a standard of rational basis in the pertinent FIS.
16. 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(c)(2) (1979).
17. Id. § 60.3(d)(3) (1979).
18. Implicit in these two uses of the FIS is a third: to stimulate a larger commitment by the community to manage its floodplain and associated resources, such as
land, wetlands, water and waste water systems, and to develop a more comprehensive basis for growth management.
Within six months of the study's completion and adoption, the community must
decide whether to join the "regular" program. 44 C.F.R. § 59.24 (1980). It cannot remain in the "emergency" or interim phase of the flood program. If it chooses to enter the "regular" program, it must signify that choice by adopting the required land
use controls. If it does not, the community is subject to suspension from the program.
The most serious consequence of such a suspension is that no new flood insurance
policies, even at actuarial rates, will be available in the community, and any existing
policies will be deemed to expire on their anniversary date. Id. See also Town of
Falmouth v. Hunter, 427 F. Supp. 26 (D. Mass. 1976).
There are other consequences. Under the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973,
12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 1709-1 (1976), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003, 4012a, 4013-4016, 4026,
4054, 4056, 4101, 4104-4107, 4121, 4128 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977), all federal financial
assistance to state, local and private interests for acquisition or construction in the
special flood hazard area of a studied community is ended. 42 U.S.C. § 4106 (1976 &
Supp. I 1977). This includes grants from the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, or the Small Business Administration, as well as federally insured loans from the Federal Housing Administration, the
Farmer's Home Administration and the Veterans Administration. It also includes federal disaster assistance for reconstruction after a flood disaster. In addition, federallyinsured banks are required to notify new or renewal mortgagors that such disaster assistance would not be available for their properties in the event of a flood. Id. §
4106(b).
19. 43 Fed. Reg. 6,030 (1978).
20. 42 Fed. Reg. 26,951 (1977), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,148, 44 Fed.
Reg. 43,239 (1979).
21. 43 Fed. Reg. 6,034 (1978).
22. 43 Fed. Reg. 6,033 (1978).
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Similarly, the National Environmental Policy Act 2 3 requires that
all major federal actions significantly affecting the human environment be based on full consideration of environmental consequences. 24 Such assessments commonly include FIS study data and
have considerable influence on the design and implementation of
federal actions, ranging from providing federal money and licensure to private parties, to federal construction and other agency developmental activities.
A number of federal agencies also have separate mandates to engage in floodplain management activities. These agencies, at their
discretion, use FIS findings in developing their own programs and
making project decisions. Chief among these are the Department
of Agriculture's Soil Conservation Service, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of Interior's Geological Survey, Bureau of
Reclamation and Bureau of Land Management, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.25
2. Characteristics of an FIS
An FIS for a particular community involves an "examination,
evaluation and determination of flood hazards and, if appropriate,
corresponding water surface elevations." 2 6 Its primary purposes are
to:
1. investigate the probability of occurrence and severity of flood
hazards in the community;
2. delineate the geographical extent of flood-prone areas;
3. establish actuarial rate zones for flood insurance;
4. determine minimum safe elevations for structures in special
flood hazard areas;
5. recommend the floodway or channel required to discharge
the 100-year flood for riverine areas; and
6. otherwise inform community authorities in order to foster
preventative approaches to flood risk management.
Despite FEMA's mandate to study "all flood plain areas . . .
which have special flood hazards," 2 7 the Agency retains considera23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976).
24. Section 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976), sets forth the requirement of incorporating such consideration into agency decision-making.
25. Other agencies with flood hazard responsibilities include the National
Weather Service, Tennessee Valley Authority and the various federal regional river
basin commissions.
26. 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (1980).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 4101(a) (1976).
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ble discretion to determine "the types, classes, and locations of any
such properties which shall be eligible for flood insurance" 28 as
well as to limit insurability to certain "States or areas (or subdivisions thereof)." 29 Before FEMA insures properties in a region, the
Agency must find that accomplishment of the statutory mandate in
the area is feasible. The finding must be based on "[s]tudies and
investigations undertaken

.

. . and information received" and on

' 30
"such other information as may be necessary. "
The regulations explain that studies "will provide the data upon
which floodplain management regulations shall be based," 31 and
will "enable [the Administrator] to estimate the risk premium rates
necessary to provide flood insurance." 32 However, the regulations
are drafted so as to preserve agency discretion. For example, they
promise flood elevation findings, but do not require that these be
translated into maps of special flood hazard areas 33 within a community or on special floodway and coastal high hazard areas.34

3. The Inevitability of Correction
Significantly, the Agency may base mandates imposed upon a
studied community on information not contained in the FIS.3 This
tends to cushion the Agency in the exercise of its discretion to
limit the FIS's specificity. But it also builds into the FIS a quantum of incompleteness, which may make the need for restudy
more likely.
Another anomaly in the restudy requirements arises from the
statutory provision indicating that an FIS need only identify the
floodplains and elevations and map flood risk zones for insurance
28. 42 U.S.C. § 4013(a)(1) (1976).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 4012(c) (1976).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 4012(b) (1976).
31. 44 C.F.R. § 60.3 (1980). See also 44 C.F.R. §§ 60.4, 60.5 (1980).
32. 44 C.F.R. § 61.7 (1980).
33. A special flood hazard area differs under the regulations from a floodplain or
"flood-prone area." Under 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (1980), a special flood hazard area is that

portion of the floodplain that is subject to flooding by the base flood. The floodplain
includes any land area susceptible-even at probabilities less than one percent per
year-to inundation by water from any source.
34. 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(a) (1980).
35. The Act clearly authorizes FEMA to develop its comprehensive land use criteria on the basis of "such other information as [the Administrator] deems necessary." 42 U.S.C. § 4102(c) (1976). Thus, for example, available information on
wetlands or on mudslide hazards might be used as the basis for requiring controls
specifically addressed to those concerns. However, as a practical matter, such information may frequently be incomplete or not provided in the FIS.
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purposes. Because the Act places the burden on FEMA to provide
technical assistance to communities for the adoption and enforcement of the required controls, 3 6 the Agency has an incentive to
pare down studies which grow beyond the minimum proportions
required by law.
The statute does not address the need for or timing of restudy.
Instead, it provides for ad hoc corrective action during a limited
period. It allows ninety days for the pursuit of administrative appeals. The "sole basis" permitted for such appeals is "that the elevations .. .are scientifically or technically incorrect."3 7 It also provides for later appeal to a United States district court by "any
appellant aggrieved by any final determination . . .upon administrative appeal." 3 8 FEMA is required to respond to timely charges
that its elevation data are scientifically or technically incorrect.3 9
The statute does not expressly prohibit later challenges and corrective responses by the Agency. Nor does it limit the possibility
or timing of restudies to the prescribed appeals process. Indeed,
the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973,40 which amended the
NFIA, provides that notification to communities and restudies may
become necessary whenever "information becomes available . . .
concerning the existence of flood hazards in communities not [originally] known to be flood-prone." 4 1 FEMA has developed detailed
36. Id.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 4104(b) (1976).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 4104(g) (1976 & Supp. 1 1977).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4104(d), 4 1 04 (e) (1976).
40. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 1709-1 (1976), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003, 4012a, 4013-4016,
4026, 4054, 4056, 4101, 41044107, 4121, 4128 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 4105(c) (1976). FEMA regulations specify that a restudy will be
conducted when a community's base flood elevations change as a result of physical
changes affecting flooding conditions. 44 C.F.R. § 65.5 (1980). In this one circumstance, the regulations make explicit what the statute only implies: that when certain
risk attributes change, at least to some unspecified level of significance, insurance
rates should be adjusted to reflect those changes and a restudy is therefore a proper
course of action. This is consistent with the statutory basis for an administrative
appeal-that FIS elevations are "scientifically or technically incorrect."
This open-ended feature of the NFIP and the lack of finality of agency determinations are mirrored in the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-558, 701-706 (1976 & Supp. II 1978), which is applicable to all
agencies engaged in rule-making and adjudicatory actions. "Each agency shall give
an interested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a
rule." Id. § 553(e). Thus, the Agency has the continuing responsibility to respond adequately to petitions for corrective action on any FIS in effect, since both the Agency
and the federal courts have construed FIS determinations as a form of rule-making.
For example, in Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025, 1032
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regulations that suggest other circumstances under which the
Agency may find it advisable to enlarge, correct or otherwise modify an original FIS. 4 2 For example, because an FIS is primarily designed to determine insurance premiums, 4 3 it may not deal fully
with other aspects of comprehensive floodplain management, such
as information on human safety, flood warning, emergency preparedness, construction design specifications and setbacks for. new
construction." Community insistence on such additional informa(D.D.C. 1978), aff'd mem., 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927
(1979), the court described the program as "quasi-legislative." But cf. K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT § § 7.03, 7.05 (3d ed. 1972).
The APA reinforces the requirement for agency responsiveness to such petitions
by providing a continuing right to judicial review for any "person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute [e.g., the NFIA]." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
Therefore, agency accountability for necessary corrective measures such as a restudy
is of a continuing nature, and can be triggered by petitions to the agency and appeals to federal courts.
42. 44 C.F.R. §§ 59-75 (1980).
43. See, e.g., 44 C.F.R. § 64.3(a) (1980).
44. FEMA regulations list a number of factors to be considered in adopting
floodplain management regulations:
(1) Human safety;
(2) Diversion of development to areas safe from flooding in light of the need to
reduce flood damages and in light of the need to prevent environmentally
incompatible flood plain use;
(3) Full disclosure to all prospective and interested parties (including but not
limited to purchasers and renters) that (i) certain structures are located
within flood-prone areas, (ii) variances have been granted for certain structures located within flood-prone areas, and (iii) premium rates applied to
new structures built at elevations below the base flood substantially increase as the elevation decreases;
(4) Adverse effects of flood plain development on existing development;
(5) Encouragement of floodproofing to reduce flood damage;
(6) Flood warning and emergency preparedness plans;
(7) Provision for alternative vehicular access and escape routes when normal
routes are blocked or destroyed by flooding;
(8) Establishment of minimum floodproofing and access requirements for
schools, hospitals, nursing homes, orphanages, penal institutions, fire stations, police stations, communications centers, water and sewage pumping
stations, and other public or quasi-public facilities already located in the
floodprone area, to enable them to withstand flood damage, and to facilitate
emergency operations;
(9) Improvement of the local drainage to control increased runoff that might increase the danger of flooding to other properties;
(10) Coordination of plans with neighboring community's flood plain management programs;
(11) The requirement that all new construction and substantial improvements in
areas subject to subsidence be elevated above the base flood level equal to
expected subsidence for at least a ten year period;
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tion may bring about further agency study.45
Thus, while the Agency's duty to maintain FIS accuracy is a
continuing one, the statute presently offers only a variety of correction alternatives, including the formal restudy option, without providing real guidance to the Agency. This approach has not prevented litigation;" indeed, it may even have promoted it.
B.

Substantive Groundsfor Restudy

. The NFIA states the substantive grounds for administrative and
judicial review of an appeal of FIS conclusions: "[t]he sole basis
for such appeal shall be the possession of knowledge or information
indicating that the elevations . . . proposed . . . are scientifically or
technically incorrect ...."-47 This provision establishes a qualitative
standard by which FISs are to be evaluated and, if found deficient,
are to be improved upon or replaced with a restudy. However,
(12) For riverine areas, requiring subdividers to furnish delineations for floodways before approving a subdivision;
(13) Prohibition of any alteration or relocation of a watercourse, except as part of
an overall drainage basin plan. In the event of an overall drainage basin
plan, provide that the flood carrying capacity within the altered or relocated
portion of the watercourse is maintained;
(14) Requirement of setbacks for new construction within Zones V1-30 on a
community's FIRM;
(15) Requirement of additional elevation above the base flood level for all new
construction and substantial improvements within Zones A1-30 and V1-30
on the community's FIRM to protect against such occurrences as wave
wash and floating debris, to provide an added margin of safety against
floods having a magnitude greater than the base flood, or to compensate for
future urban development;
(16) Requirement of consistency between state, regional and local comprehensive plans and flood plain management programs;
(17) Requirement of pilings or columns rather than fill, for the elevation of
structures within flood-prone areas, in order to maintain the storage capacity of the flood plain and to minimize the potential for negative impacts to
sensitive ecological areas;
(18) Prohibition, within any floodway or coastal high hazard area, of plants or facilities in which hazardous substances are manufactured.
44 C.F.R. § 60.22(c) (1980).
45.

The Agency has conceded, at least as a discretionary matter, its amenability to

such entreaties. 44 C.F.R.

§ 60.3 (1980) provides that the Agency "will provide the

data upon which flood plain management regulations shall be based." Virtually identical language appears in 44 C.F.R. §§ 60.4, 60.5 (1980).
46. Roberts v. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, 473 F. Supp. 52 (N.D.

Miss. 1979); Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025, 1032
(D.D.C. 1978), aff'd mem., 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927
(1979); Town of Falmouth v. Hunter, 427 F. Supp. 26 (D. Mass. 1976).

47. 42 U.S.C.

§ 4101(b) (1976).
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from a practical perspective, restudies may also be compelled by

reference to constitutional or administrative law standards governing local land use controls, where such controls are either based
on an FIS, or designed to demonstrate community compliance with
NFIP requirements. Court-ordered invalidation of land use controls, where FIS deficiencies are the cause, could defeat a community's efforts to conform to NFIP requirements until legally defensible restudies are prepared." Thus, when the elevation findings of
an original study are found to be "incorrect" or otherwise fail to
support the challenged floodplain regulatory measures, restudy is
needed to give the community a legal basis for participating in the
NFIP.
What follows is a survey of the statutory and constitutional
grounds for restudy summarized in the previous paragraph.
1. "Scientifically or Technically Incorrect"
The phenomenon most likely to reveal the flaws in an FIS is,
quite aptly, a flood. Flood levels in excess of the predicted base
flood should prompt reconsideration of the methods or data used in
the FIS. Even a flood which is statistically foreseeable and does
not contradict the conclusions of an FIS--even one which largely
verifies the study-may provoke doubts, and it may therefore be
reasonable for the Agency to restudy the flood area.
Courts may require that actual flood data be used as a basis for
changing community floodplain management, and thereby indirectly promote FEMA restudies. In A.H. Smith Sand & Gravel
Co. v. Department of Water Resources,4 9 community floodplain
regulations were based on a fifty-year base flood,50 as determined
by the Maryland Department of Water Resources. In the wake of
Hurricane Agnes, a storm which produced flood conditions thought
to occur less frequently than once in fifty years, the trial court ordered modification of the regulations to reflect the actual extent of
flooding. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed this order. It rejected an argument that the lower court should have deferred to
agency expertise, stating:
48.

See, e.g., Town of Falmouth v. Hunter, 427 F. Supp. 26 (D. Mass. 1976).

49.
50.

270 Md. 652, 313 A.2d 820 (1974).
That is, "waters of the state" was statutorily defined to include "the

floodplain of free-flowing waters on the basis of a fifty (50) year flood frequency,"
and regulations prohibited the placement of structures within that floodplain. Id. at

655-56, 313 A.2d at 822-23.
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[t]he conclusion reached by an administrative agency, with all of
its expertise, can be no more solid than the factual basis upon
which it rests. .

.

. [T]he Department at the time it made its de-

termination as to the floodplain just did not have before it information as exact as was available after storm Agnes. 51
Thus, as common sense would suggest, a flood, by showing the fallacy in scientific predictions, can sweep away an FIS along with the
property the FIS was meant to protect.
Another, but less common, factor promoting restudy is change in
a community's boundaries or authority. Often in such circumstances, existing studies continue to justify their corresponding insurance rates.5 2 However, the new community to be covered by
flood insurance must have its boundaries integrated into the prior
study and insurance rate structure. When annexation or jurisdictional change brings "new land," such as previously unstudied and
federally-owned land, into a community, restudy of part or all of
what has been studied before, as well as initial study of the new
area, may be needed.
Finally, community requests for greater factual detail from
FEMA can also lead to restudy. If a community initiates floodplain
management regulations and desires additional information, FEMA
regulations acknowledge its responsibility to develop such data,
possibly by means of a restudy. 5 3 Discretion in this matter continues to rest with FEMA, 54 but without a restudy, community efforts
at floodplain regulation may be undermined and become more vulnerable to legal challenge.
In sum, a restudy may become necessary because of scientific or
technical error, the sudden availability of new data, judicial mandate, or community request.
2.

"Arbitrary and Capricious" Administrative Action
Because FIS determinations constitute informal rule-making, 55
51. Id. at 667, 313 A.2d at 828-29.
52. See 44 C.F.R. § 64.4 (1980).
53. See note 45 supra.
54. The regulations cited in note 45, supra, use the future tense ("will") rather
than the imperative ("shall"), suggesting a statement of intent rather than a regulatory mandate.
55. In Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025, 1032 (D.D.C.
1978), affd mem., 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979), the
court, in denying plaintiff's constitutional claims that the NFIP violated the sovereign powers of the state and local governments and that it constituted a taking of
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they are also subject to review under the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard5 6 of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 57 This test
has been held to incorporate as well as enlarge upon the "scientifically or technically incorrect" test specifically set out in the
58
NFIA.
Neither test, however, is very stringent. Neither, for example,
requires judicial disapproval of FIS determinations which are not
the most accurate or reliable, as long as the determinations are not
"incorrect." Indeed, the NFIA may limit a litigant's prospects for
relief under the more broadly worded APA standard. The NFIA
test's emphasis on scientific and technical factors would appear to
render irrelevant proof of an "arbitrary" formulation of policy, so
long as "correct" facts could be adduced to support it.
In Roberts v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 59 the court stated what it felt were the basic principles governing judicial review of an FIS:
[ulnder the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review of
agency action, the reviewing court is to search for clear error of
judgment. .

.

. [I]t is not for the reviewing court to supply its

own interpretation so long as the interpretat ion or determination
applied by the agency was reasonable, even though that interpretation might not appear as reasonable as some others ....

A

decision, to be "arbitrary and capricious," must be based on facts
not supported by the record .... 60
their land without compensation or due process protections, characterized the NFIP
as a program which "appears to fit well within the quasi-legislative [rule-making]
decision-making process." Id. at 1032 (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d
624, 633 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 842 (1966)). This terminology is normally
applied to denote rule-making rather than adjudication or at least to denote that an
adjudicatory process is not involved. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 55, at
143 (1976). In Roberts v. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, 473 F. Supp. 52
(N.D. Miss. 1979), the court granted summary judgment to HUD after finding that
the plaintiff failed to raise any genuine issue to support his claim that an FIS was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion (because the agency had failed to take
into account potential changes in the Tombigbee Waterway Project and related highway and bridge projects). The court did not, however, reject the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of the APA as the applicable standard. Under the APA, which
applies to all agencies, this standard is the judicial standard for the review of informal rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
56. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
57. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-558, 701-706 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
58. Roberts v. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, 473 F. Supp. 52 (N.D.
Miss. 1979). This is particularly true since the APA now clearly requires a "substantial inquiry" in administrative rulemaking. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
59. 473 F. Supp. 52 (N.D. Miss. 1979).
60. Id. at 54, 55.
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When applying these principles, the court construed the NFIA
standard, "scientifically or technically incorrect," as a specific element of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.
Constitutional Claim: Police Power Infringement of
Due Process
An FIS may also be challenged as violative of due process under
the fifth or fourteenth amendment. This sort of claim might arise
where a property owner believes the risk estimate in an FIS impairs the value of his land. The federal flood surveys are intended
to shape land use; a consequent impact on market values is inevitable. However, an attack on the NFIP as a whole is unlikely to
succeed. The grievance procedures set forth in the statute are
probably ample to withstand a generic charge of "arbitrary" federal
action such as failure to afford substantive or procedural due
process.
Moreover, the only court to address the question has upheld the
NFIP. In Texas Landowners Rights Association v. Harris,6 1 the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia determined that the NFIP provides reasonable measures for protecting
public health and safety and "equitably spread[ing] the costs of
flood disaster among those landowners who most benefit from publicly funded disaster relief," 62 and was not an irrational exercise of
Congress's powers.
Of course, similar claims may still be made against particular applications of the NFIP, or against the FIS for a particular community. However, in light of Texas Landowners, such claims are likely
to be rejected where the Agency substantially follows its articulated
procedures.
In turn, state and local land use controls based upon the FIS
may face the same constitutional attack. But harm to the value of
one owner's land will not usually rise to the stature of a due process violation. Professor Allison Dunham, when considering whether
floodplain regulations can withstand due process challenges, concluded: "[w]herever it is reasonable to conclude that a particular
use of a floodplain or . . . channel is likely to increase flood damage to other users of land, there would seem to be no due process
objection to restrictingr or even prohibiting the opportunity to make
3.

61. 453 F. Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1978), affd mem., 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979).
62. Id. at 1032.
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the use causing the harm. " 63
Thus, land use control actions taken to prevent floods and flood
damage will generally be upheld against due process challenges as
long as these actions can be reasonably related to the objective of
protecting the public health, safety or welfare. As the Supreme
Court of Georgia recently stated when it upheld the denial of a
construction permit under a floodplain regulation: "exercise of
the police power [is] subject to the limitation that the ordinance
[restricting land uses] bear some 'reasonable relation' to the public

health. -64
In this constitutional setting, the "reasonableness" of the FIS
may become the underlying issue. That is, the federal flood study
may, as a practical matter, be the only means of relating the ordinance to the necessary public interest in flood hazard mitigation.
The courts have not yet explored the distinction, if any, between a
"reasonableness" test of an FIS and the statutory standards
for review discussed heretofore in this article.
4.

Constitutional Claim: "Taking" of Private Property
The guarantee against public "takings" of private property is
closely related to the due process safeguard.65 The different connotations are, however, of legal significance. The former involves
devotion of property, through regulation, to public purposes; the
latter, an impingement on property rights which is unreasonable
when compared to the hindrance presented to other private own6
ers.
One test for ascertaining whether a particular regulation amounts
to a taking is the "balancing test" stated in Texas Landowners. In
that case, in which the court found the NFIA to be facially constitutional, the court stated that, like the due process and equal protection guarantees, the taking clause basically requires a test of reasonableness. Thus, it concluded, whenever the government acts to
protect the safety and welfare of a community or area, the action
will not be considered a taking so long as it "is shown to be related
63. Dunham, Flood Control via the Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1098, 1123
(1959) (emphasis added).
64. Pope v. Atlanta, 242 Ga. 331, 334, 249 S.E.2d 16, 19 (1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 936 (1979).
65. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
66. See Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 593-94, 350
N.E.2d 381, 384-85, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 990 (1976).
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to a legitimate public interest." 67 Obviously, an FIS would be used
to make the necessary showing and its reasonableness could therefore come under attack.
Some state courts have used an alternative test for takings, a jurisprudence which addresses the diminution of value or economic
hardship associated with a regulation. In Dooley v. Town Plan and
Zoning Commission,6 8 this test was applied to a flood control restriction which permitted only parks, playgrounds, wildlife sanctuaries, clubhouses, docks and agriculture. 69 The court found a taking, relying for its holding on the magnitude of the diminution of
property value. This test does not typically look at the quality of
FIS elevation determinations; it focuses on the results, not the underlying data or analyses, of agency action.
While the courts have not always been explicit about which test
is being applied when considering a taking issue, 70 under at least
some formulations the reasonableness of the FIS upon which a regulation is based may affect the resolution of that issue. Thus, the
quality of an FIS may be evaluated in a judicial proceeding under a
variety of constitutional standards, as well as the APA's "arbitrary
and capricious," and the NFIA's "scientifically or technically incorrect," standards.
5. Constitutional Claim: Equal Protection
The equal protection clause, which requires that any classification created by statute or regulation be rationally related to a valid
statutory objective, can form the basis for challenging an FIS. The
essence of the federal study is as a basis for classifying tracts of
land by their pregnability to floodwaters. It is further used to draw
zoning boundaries, to designate floodways, or to demark the base
flood for a community.
Of course, the law recognizes that no system which involves classification is perfect. In zoning and wetlands cases involving equal
protection claims, the courts have generally deferred to legislative
67. Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025, 1032, aff'd
mem., 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 927 (1979).
68. 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964).
69. But see Brecciaroli v. Comm'r of Environmental Protection, 168 Conn. 349,
362 A.2d 948 (1975); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284
N.E.2d 891, cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1108 (1972).
70. See, e.g., Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of ParsippanyTroy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7,

201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
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as well as administrative decisions. This deference to the legislature typically rests on one of two grounds. First, it is often said
that classification, as a means of effecting policies to protect the
public health or safety, is a function constitutionally granted to the
legislature. Second, the electoral process is seen as assuring that
legislators will be more sensitive to community needs than might
be those in other branches of government. Deference to agency
decisions rests commonly on the ground of agency expertise.
On these bases, state courts have usually denied equal protection challenges to land use classifications and boundaries set by local authorities. 71 The issue is somewhat more difficult, however,
when the boundary is set, not on policy grounds (e.g., residential
and commercial zones), but on the basis of engineering judgment.
It has been observed:
[i]f a prestated flood regulatory approach is used for flood plain
zoning with boundary lines forming the final limits of the hazard,
imprecise location of the lines based upon poor data should not
be excused on the basis that more conventional zoning district
boundaries are more or less arbitrary. In contrast to more conventional zoning boundary lines which reflect broad community
land use goals, flood hazard district lines reflect physical conditions by engineering techniques if time and money are available.
Line locations differ somewhat, depending upon the engineering
methods, data used for calculations, and assumptions in flood
calculations. In a given situation, various engineering techniques
will produce varied results. But
flood zoning lends itself to some
72
degree of technical precision.
Thus, courts may be more willing to scrutinize boundaries or other
land use classifications based on engineering analysis than those
based on policy choice. Consequently, the constitutional validity of
FIS-based classifications may depend on whether the FIS itself can
be regarded as a rational and objective basis for land classification
and its resultant differential impact on similarly situated persons.

C. Justification to Adopt New Study Methodology
Probing for legally cognizable flaws in study methodology is an
exercise usually conducted quite apart from review of scientific or
technical correctness. While the latter inquiry concerns itself with
71. See NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., LAND USE CONTROLS IN
THE UNITED STATES 12 (1977).
72. 1 U.S. WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, REGULATION OF FLOOD HAZARD AREAS
TO REDUCE FLOOD LOSSES § 3-322 at 333 (1970).
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the aptness of study conclusions, the former focuses on the very
processes of engineering logic. To be sure, the cases do not reveal
great zest on the part of the judiciary to delve into such complexities. But it is apparent that a study based on assumptions known
by the Agency to be untrustworthy may for that reason be invalidated pursuant to the NFIA. On the other hand, where the
Agency can show that a more perfect methodology would require
unduly expensive studies, a court may not disturb otherwise vulnerable agency conclusions.
1. Incorrect Assumptions
In preparing to conduct an FIS, the Agency must make certain
assumptions to provide the mode of investigation or "methodology"
for the study. Some of these assumptions have been required by
applicable law, while others are the result of agency considerations
of cost, consistency or practicality. Regardless of their source, however, such assumptions can increase the inaccuracy and uncertainty
of the FIS, because they may have been developed for quite different circumstances and purposes. Obviously, a complex legal problem arises where the law mandates or tolerates such assumptions
while, at the same time, demands that results not be "scientifically
or technically incorrect."
One aspect of an FIS which vividly illustrates this problem is the
estimation of the dimension of the base flood. This involves questions of hydraulics, that branch of physics having to do with the
mechanical properties of water and other liquids. In hydraulic
modelling, a key assumption presently made is "steady state gradually varied" flow, i.e., that the flow estimated in the analysis will
enter and leave the study area at a constant rate, and that changes
in the water surface slope are not abrupt. 73 In legal terms, this assumption can be "incorrect," as the flow typically does not actually
enter and leave the study area at a constant rate. Indeed, a key explanation of flooding is that the flow enters at a faster rate than it
leaves. In engineering terms, however, the uniform-flow assumption is a rough approximation of reality that greatly reduces the
complexity of the hydraulic model at a cost-justifiable reduction in
accuracy. Moreover, the assumption is most accurate at the moment of peak flooding, presumably the moment of most interest in
73. See Office of Federal Insurance and Hazard Mitigation, Federal Insurance
Administration, Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Statement of Work for
Flood Insurance Studies ch. 2 (Apr. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Statement of Work].
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an FIS. Thus, the use of the assumption is a reasonable exercise of
engineering judgment.
The legal difficulty with this engineering judgment is that the
steady state approximation is known to be incorrect in some circumstances. While other steps in FIS methodology introduce uncertainty into the study because their degree of correctness is unknown, this assumption is known at the outset to be false. This fact
leads to the inquiry whether, as a legal matter, an elevation determination based on a steady state assumption is "scientifically or
technically incorrect" by definition, even without any further showing on the part of a challenger.
Even in the absence of a statutory requirement to be scientifically and technically correct, courts have been reluctant to approve
regulations based on studies using assumptions known to be incorrect. In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 74 for example, the court invalidated a portion of the EPA's effluent limitations for the pulp and
paper industry because they were based on an analysis which re' 75
lied on an "assumption that it [EPA] now admits is erroneous."
Similarly, in FMC Corp. v. Train,76 the court remanded part of
the EPA's synthetics and plastics industry effluent limitations for
reconsideration because of "substantial questions" that had been
raised concerning the use of a uniform flow assumption for
modelled discharges, when actual discharges varied widely from
the assumed rate. 7 7 Both of these cases support the view that an
FIS for which the Agency knowingly incorporates dubious assumptions can be invalid. However, the FMC decision also suggests that
even an assumption which is subject to substantial deviation can be
utilized if sufficiently justified by engineering considerations and its
inaccuracy is explained and understood. Indeed, the court insisted
78
that the EPA be given "latitude to make ... assumptions."
2. New Federal Guidelines
Presently, federal agencies and advisory bodies such as the
United States Geological Survey 79 and the Water Resources Coun74. 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
75. Id. at 1029.
76. 539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1976).
77. Id. at 980. Note, however, that the court stopped short of holding that the
EPA could not use its uniform flow assumption.
78. Id. at 984-85. Of course, in FMC no statutory "incorrectness" standard applied.
79. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, DEP'T OF INTERIOR, NATIONAL
FOR MANAGING FLOOD LosSES § 4 (rev. ed. 1976).

PROGRAM

1982]

Managing Flood Risk

0 are empowered
cil0
to recommend or adopt methodologies for certain aspects of FISs. These methodologies frequently apply to prototypical floodplains and, when the real case resembles the
prototypical, FEMA may suggest or require use of the methods in
its contracted studies.8 1 However, these methodologies are
updated from time to time in order to incorporate new developments and policy assumptions.8 2 When this happens, it is prudent
to adopt the new methodology as the basis for future studies. By
implication, the Agency may also be under a legal duty to do so, or
to conduct a restudy which incorporates the new guidelines.
Where a great many completed studies relied on the obsolete
methodological regime, it may be uneconomical to undertake programmatic restudy. But at a minimum, the new methodological
guidelines should, during case-by-case review, serve as a basis for
restudy.

D.

Inherent Technical Uncertainty
Uncertainty is a condition familiar to physicists, engineers and
lawyers. Hence reported judicial decisions have, in a few cases,
recognized that technical uncertainty in land use regulation cannot
be avoided, and, where it leads to errors, must sometimes be
forgiven. These cases have not, as yet, satisfactorily explained how
much error is too much, i.e., "scientifically or technically incorrect." As a starting point, however, this article suggests that the
Agency disclose the likely areas of technical uncertainty, so as not
to prejudice the interests of those who would be affected by errors.
Technical uncertainty arises from several factors: the random nature of floods, the incomplete data base available to the Agency,
the limitations of the available analytical models and assumptions,
and purely computational error. This technical uncertainty may be
compounded by other factors: for example, the Agency's desire for
consistent study results for all communities located in the same
river basin, and the Agency's hesitancy to restudy merely because
better hydrological or other data or improved methods have become available.
80. HYDROLOGY COMMITTEE, U.S. WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, BULL. No. 17,
GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING FLOOD FLOW FREQUENCY (1976) [hereinafter cited
as BULL. No. 17].

81. See Statement of Work, supra note 73, at ch. 2.
82. See, e.g., HYDROLOGY COMMITTEE, U.S. WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, BULL.
No. 17A, GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING FLOOD FLOW FREQUENCY (1979) [herein-

after cited as BULL. No. 17A], replaces BULL. 17, supra note 80. BULL. 17A apparently offers more flexibility than its predecessor in utilizing other data beyond gauge
records, where special circumstances justify their use.
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Despite the technical uncertainty, the results of FISs are frequently utilized, both by FEMA and the communities participating
in the flood program, as if they were completely accurate. An example is the determination of the boundaries of the base flood
area. On one side of these boundaries, insurance for new construction may be available only at actuarial rates, while on the other, no
such restriction may exist 8 3 On one side, land use and building restrictions may be imposed, while on the other, they may not. Further, within the boundary of the regulatory floodway, building is
essentially prohibited.8 4 Thus, while the exact location of a particular boundary may be open to scientific debate, the regulatory consequences of the boundary directly affect specific private property
rights. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that such regulatory
consequences are occasionally imposed on landowners whose properties are not actually within the applicable boundaries.
Legal challenges to the FIS can be expected to arise, at least in
part, because technical uncertainty inevitably results in some divergence between results and objective reality. If the party
challenging a floodplain management decision is successful in overcoming the usual judicial deference to agency expertise and secures
judicial invalidation of the challenged decision, this can reduce or
destroy the credibility of the underlying FIS.
However, in the few reported decisions thus far concerning
NFIP, courts have shown much solicitude for the difficulty of the
Agency's mission, and somewhat less for incidental injury to landowners. The court in Roberts stated: "factual certainty is not
necessary, and an agency may regulate even though facts do not illuminate a clear path." 8 5 The question of whether a single number
(or elevation) can be the basis of regulation when, because of unavoidable technical uncertainty, only a range of numbers can be
supported by the underlying studies has been considered by courts
in other contexts. In E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,8
the Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative when
it was posed in the context of the EPA's industrial effluent limitation regulations.8 7 Thereafter, in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle,8 8 the
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
cable

44 C.F.R. § 64.5 (1980).
44 C.F.R. § 60.3 (1980).
473 F. Supp. 52, 55 (N.D. Miss. 1979).
430 U.S. 112 (1977).
However, the Court's analysis turned primarily on an interpretation of applistatutory language and legislative history, and thus does not directly support
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D.C. Circuit undertook to set a standard for reviewing a technical
analysis underlying a regulatory limitation. The court noted the
problem of "technological and scientific uncertainty"'8 9 that must be
overcome when conducting such an analysis. The court then
quoted its own earlier statement: "[wihere existing methodology or
research in a new area of regulation is deficient, the agency necessarily enjoys [a] broad discretion to attempt to formulate a solution
to the best of its ability on the basis of available information.- 90 Indeed, in Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,9 1 the Supreme Court approved the simultaneous use of more than one analytical methodology when an agency is deciding how to regulate.
The statutory appeals process offers landowners the chief vehicle
for overturning incorrect and injurious findings. But a preventative
measure by the Agency-namely, disclosure of areas of significant
technical uncertainty-would supplement the grievance procedure
in a useful way.
Because of the various technical problems inherent in the NFIP,
it is a major responsibility of FEMA to understand and disclose
this uncertainty when conducting FISs. As the D.C. Circuit noted
recently: "the lack of scientific certitude about modeling techniques increases rather than reduces the need for the agency to
critically examine all substantial questions of fact and science...92
III.

INITIATIVES

Compulsory legal process is not the only means for bringing
about restudy of an FIS. The Agency has authority to initiate a
restudy even in the absence of a legally binding order to do so.
the proposition that FEMA may require land use controls everywhere in the base
flood area without making individual determinations that each property is subject to
flooding.
The decision would be more helpful if the Supreme Court had directly addressed
the issue of whether single number limitations may be promulgated when the underlying studies support a range of limitations. The Court seems to have assumed that a
single number would be authorized if the FWPCA were construed to authorize it.
However, the Court did not indicate whether it was aware that the EPA's data would
better support a range of limitations.
88. 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
89. Id. at 1026.
90. Id. (quoting Indus. Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-75 n.18 (D.C.
Cir. 1978)). Similarly, in FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973, 978 (4th Cir. 1976), the
court stated that its evaluation of the technical analysis underlying the EPA's regulations must be conducted in light of the serious time constraints imposed on it.
91. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
92. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 387-88 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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This power supplements statutory notice and appeals procedures
which are available to individuals and communities seeking redress
of specific grievances. But at present the Agency lacks formal criteria to decide whether or not to make a discretionary commitment
to restudy. The NFIA is also without provisions which might
encourage the Agency to improve accuracy through restudy. Adoption by the Agency of clear criteria for the exercise of the discretion to restudy would be in the public interest.
A.

Current Status of Discretionary Criteria
1.

Structured Response to Individual Grievances
The NFIA and FEMA regulations provide a highly structured
administrative appeals process 93 which enables individual property
owners and lessees and the community to challenge the flood elevations of the FIS while it is in "proposed status."
Following the determination of "projected flood elevations" and
notice, 94 the statute provides for a ninety-day period during which
appeals may be brought. 95 Such appeals must be brought initially
to the community's chief executive officer or delegate, and must
"set forth the data that tend to negate or contradict the . . . finding." 96 The official has the responsibility to review and consolidate
all appeals filed during the statutory period and reach a decision as
to whether or not the community itself should appeal to FEMA on
97
behalf of such persons.
If the community decides to appeal, FEMA must respond either
"by consultation with [local] officials . . . , by administrative hearing, or by submission of the conflicting data to an independent scientific body or appropriate Federal agency for advice."98 In any
case, so long as the Agency proposes to extend NFIP benefits to
the community, FEMA is responsible for making a final determination on such an appeal. The information relied on by FEMA in
dealing with the appeal must be made publicly available. 9 9 If the
93.
94.
95.
96.

42 U.S.C. § 4104 (1976 & Supp. I 1977).
Id. §§ 44104(b)
(976).
42 U.S.C. § 4104(b) (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 4104(c) (1976).

97. Id.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 4104(e) (1976).
99. Id. The responsibility for the final elevation determination rests with the
administrative law judge, in cases where appeals are resolved by administrative
hearing.
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community or its aggrieved citizens are not satisfied with FEMA's
final determination, either or both may appeal to a federal district
court within sixty days of receiving notice of the final decision. 1' °
If the community decides not to appeal, FEMA must nevertheless review the individual owner/lessee complaints along with the
community's decision, and ultimately must reach its own decision. 1 1 In reaching its decision, it must follow one or more of the
same three courses of action prescribed for community appeals:
consultation, administrative hearing, or reliance on an independent
scientific body or other federal agency.' 0 2 Following notice of a final decision, aggrieved individuals may appeal in federal district
court within sixty days.' 0 3
Short of these formal procedures, aggrieved persons or communities have several alternate modes of recourse. One route is
immediate protest of published "notifications" of flood elevation
or of insurance rates. A second involves correction of pure cartographic error by invoking a specified map amendment proceeding.
These are explained below.
FEMA has a continuing opportunity to identify new-data and resolve problems even before promulgating its FIS findings. This opportunity arises from an NFIA provision requiring FEMA to "publish notification of flood elevation determinations in a prominent
local newspaper" during the period in which the community con100.
101.

42 U.S.C. § 4104(g) (1976 & Supp. 1 1977).
42 U.S.C. § 4104(d) (1976).

102. Id.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 4104(g) (1976 & Supp. 1 1977). These two appeals processes involve the same substantive issue and evidentiary considerations, and the statute
imposes similar procedural responsibilities on FEMA. The Agency has established
regulations to implement the statute, 44 C.F.R. §§ 67, 68 (1980), which are substantially consistent with the statutory requirements, but which also reflect certain
agency priorities.
For example, the regulations provide for an administrative hearing "only ... if a
community appeals ... and the Administrator has determined that such appeal cannot be resolved by consultation with officials of the community, or by submission of
the . . . data to an independent scientific body or appropriate Federal agency for advice." 44 C.F.R. § 68.3 (1980). Similarly, for any "owner or lessee" who appeals, the
regulations provide for submission to the community of a "written appeal" with technical data, 44 C.F.R. § 67.5 (1980), community review and consideration, and issuance of a written opinion, 44 C.F.R. §§ 67.7(a), 67.7(c) (1980); if the community decides not to appeal, FEMA will independently review the individual claims pursuant
to its procedures for reviewing community appeals. 44 C.F.R. § 6 7 .9(a) (1980). Thus,
while the regulations offer the same administrative hearing option for both community and individual appeals in accordance with the enabling statute, such a hearing
is clearly more readily available when a community appeals.
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siders adopting the land use controls. 10 4 The Agency is also required to disseminate insurance coverage and rate information,
including "the basis for and differences between such rates,"' 10 5 and
to consult with local officials and encourage them to disseminate
study information.1 0 6 These provisions enable property owners and
lessees to appeal "scientifically or technically incorrect" elevations.
Moreover, by stimulating local awareness of ongoing FIS research,
these provisions also allow certain errors to be disclosed and corrected before final administrative action.
FEMA regulations also provide a "map amendment" procedure
for handling grievances from individuals who claim inadvertent inclusion in special flood hazard areas due to map application errors. 10 7 Therefore, certain individual appeals based, for example,
on "the transposition of the curvilinear line to either street or to
other readily identifiable features" 10 8 will be handled by submitting
technical data specified in the regulations to FEMA for review and
determination. No opportunity to appear, make oral presentations,
104.
105.

42 U.S.C. § 4104(b) (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 4020 (1976).

106.

Id.

107. 44 C.F.R. § 70 (1980).
108. 44 C.F.R. § 70.1 (1980). A basic due process principle governing mapping
for land use management purposes is that every owner of property is entitled to ascertain, with reasonable certainty, what uses he may legally make of any portion of
his property. Town of Lebanon v. Woods, 153 Conn. 182, 215 A.2d 112 (1965). In order to achieve this result, most courts require that zones be described with reasonable certainty and have definite boundaries. See Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 766, 769 (1955).
Where it is not possible to define boundaries with certainty from an ordinance itself
and a zoning map, the ordinance cannot be enforced and is invalid. Slattery v. Township of Caldwell, 83 N.J. Super. 317, 199 A.2d 670 (1964). See also City of Benton v.
Phillips, 191 Ark. 961, 88 S.W.2d 828 (1935); Auditorium, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 47 Del. 373, 91 A.2d 528 (1952); Moon v. Smith, 138 Fla. 410, 189 So. 835
(1939); Rock Island Metal Foundry, Inc. v. Rock Island, 414 I11.436, 111 N.E.2d 499
(1953); Householder v. Town of Grand Island, 114 N.Y.S.2d 852, 36 Misc. 2d 862
(Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 280 A.D. 874, 114 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1952), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 805,
113 N.E.2d 555 (1953); Westlake v. Elrick, 83 N.E.2d 646 (Ohio App. 1948).
Thus, two difficulties with present flood plain mapping practice are that their scale
translates into zoning boundaries with widths from 20 to 100 feet and that the
boundaries are incapable of further specification by metes and bounds description.
In these regards, the typical map produced in a flood study is similar to the map at
issue in Adams v. Town of West Seneca, 280 A.D. 1038, 117 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1952), appeal denied, 281 A.D. 942, appeal denied, 119 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1953), where the use
districts under the town zoning ordinance were not defined by metes and bounds,
but were shown on the zoning map, drawn on a scale of 1" = 1000'. The court held
that the property owner was entitled to a building permit for a business use because
there was doubt as to whether the premises were unzoned, unrestricted farmland or
whether a small portion was zoned as residential.
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cross-examine or otherwise confront FEMA is offered to such aggrieved individuals. Rather, the regulations obviously are intended
to preclude, or at least discourage, full-blown administrative hearings for cases which do not necessarily relate to whether the elevations are "scientifically or technically incorrect."
Thus, FEMA's procedures offer a structured response to individual grievances related to alleged flood elevation errors and to alleged inadvertent inclusion cases.
However, these are only two of several circumstances where
FEMA findings and procedures may be alleged to be incorrect.
Resort to this system of grievance adjustment does not appear to
lie, for example, for substantive challenges to the insurance rate
zones in the proposed FIS. Moreover, even where an individual
obtains a remedy for his specific complaint, no mechanism exists to
preserve the impetus for review which a single successful challenge
should generate. These factors make all the more worrisome the
core problem of restudy: the absence of clear criteria for the exercise of this variety of agency discretion.
2. Existing Criteria for Comprehensive Restudy
The restudy of most or all of a community is the most complete
response FEMA can make to problems encountered with an initial
FIS. The Agency can pursue this option when faced with one or
more appeals of the elevation findings in the initial FIS. 10 9
Launching a restudy to resolve an appeal is a response created by
the Agency, for this expensive form of relief is not prescribed in
the NFIA. Indeed, the word "restudy," and the decision process
and criteria for restudy, are not to be found in FEMA's regulations, despite the fact that the Agency now conducts several hundred restudies each year. However, the Agency can also launch a
restudy before any challenges have been filed if it perceives significant FIS weaknesses and a likelihood of numerous, and particularly
successful, appeals. 1 0
The difficulty of the latter, discretionary course lies in the ab109. See Town of Falmouth v. Hunter, 427 F. Supp. 26 (D. Mass. 1976) (challenge to a restudy which had been initiated in response to administrative appeal).
Cf. 44 C.F.R. § 67.8(b) (1980).
110. In response to flooding from a 1978 blizzard, FEMA has launched restudies
for the towns of Scituate and Marshfield, Massachusetts. Letter from Edward
Thomas, Regional Director, Federal Insurance Administration, to Edward Reese,
Chairman, Board of Selectmen, Marshfield, Mass. (December 7, 1978) (copy on file
at the offices of Bracken & Baram). Cf. 44 C.F.R. § 66.1(c)(1) (1980).
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sence of criteria to help the Agency decide when to elect it. Empirical studies illustrate how variable these criteria can sometimes
be. Two major FEMA contractors who perform restudies were
asked to list their restudies and the major reasons for which they
were taken. The responses1 1 1 revealed that FEMA presently undertakes restudies to correct outdated or erroneous data inputs; to
accommodate topological or hydrological changes caused, for example, by storm damage or new construction; to utilize improved analytic methods; to accommodate greater or changed community demands; to harmonize separate studies done for the same riverine
area; or to respond to strong community opposition. Clearly,
FEMA is undertaking restudies for reasons related to program acceptance (study consistency, community demands, local opposition)
as well as for reasons related to the "correctness" of the existing
study.
The elevation appeal and map amendment proceedings also
illustrate the problem.
The map amendment process noted above does not normally involve a challenge to the scientific or technical correctness of the
flood elevation findings of an FIS. The process offers assurance that
any parties who have some data to establish their locations outside
of the special hazard areas will have appropriate amendments made
1 12
to the applicable maps.
11.

The most commonly cited reasons for restudy included:
1) hydraulic and/or hydrology outdated;
2) original study had only approximate, rather than detailed, zones;
3) original study had only limited coverage (e.g., corporate limits of community
had changed);
4) errors in floodway data and cross-sections;
5) storm damage and topological changes;
6) need to add floodways to original study;
7) coordination of detailed and approximate studies done for same riverine
area;
8) significant new construction (assumed to change hydrology) and channel improvements;
9) strong community disagreement with FIS sometimes taken into appeals process;
10) new analytic methods available, or new topological data/maps available, to
improve accuracy of findings; and
11) state/local requirements changed.
Memorandum from Bernie Claveloux, Dames & Moore, to Brian Mrazik, Federal Insurance Administration (September 24, 1979); Memorandum from William G. Fry,
Dewberry, Nealon & Davis, to Brian Mrazik, Federal Insurance Administration (September 25, 1979) (copies of both memoranda on file at the offices of Bracken &
Baram).
112. The premise for this procedure is "the technical difficulty of accurately
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It is unlikely that any single request for a map amendment will
disparage the FIS sufficiently to warrant a restudy. But such requests from several owners in a community may cumulatively cast
doubt on the accuracy of the flood boundaries. This in turn could
put in question the accuracy of the FIS elevations, and therefore
lead to a broader internal review of the FIS. Yet no criteria exist to
weigh the gravity of multiple map application errors.
Restudy and appeal procedures with respect to elevation findings
are more specific than those for map amendment, but the criteria
employed are similarly vague. Such appeals may involve substantial
challenges to the FIS based on alleged errors or omissions in FIS
data and analyses which have been developed since FIS completion. When handling such appeals, the Agency is required to "review and take fully into account any technical or scientific data
submitted . . . that tend to negate or contradict the information
upon which [the elevation] determination is based."'1 13 Nevertheless, no specific criteria are applied to decisions to make discretionary amendment or restudy. In practice, most appeals are resolved
without a hearing, through (1) FEMA refusal to revise the FISinspired map, (2) FEMA acceptance, in whole or in part, of appellants' data, and revision of the map, or (3) FEMA suspension of all
or a portion of the map and commencement of a restudy. Especially where issues are resolved without the formal protections of a
hearing, it is important that objective criteria for case disposition
be in place. Fairness is one value at stake in the creation of objective bases for decision; economy is another. Restudy may be too
costly in one setting, but in other circumstances contesting an appeal may prove just as extravagant a use of agency resources.
To date, FEMA has not established a structured restudy decision
process with articulated criteria of a generic nature. As a result,
agency response to substantial challenges or problems with its
FISs remains an ad hoc and unpredictable process conducted on
the basis of uncertain and variable criteria. A structured and consistent approach is within the Agency's capabilities, and would provide the benefits of cost-effectiveness to the Agency, and predictability and accountability to the public.
delineating [a] curvilinear line on either a FHBM o" FIRM." 44 C.F.R. § 70.1 (1980).
Thus, FEMA has created a procedure for relief for "any owner or lessee of property
(applicant) who believes his property has been inadvertently included" in the Special Flood Hazard Area. 44 C.F.R. § 7 0.3 (a) (1980). In practice, agency responses indicate that relief is routinely available for single-property challenges.
113. 44 C.F.R. § 6 7 .8(a) (1980).
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3. "Forcing" Accuracy by Statute
Some enabling statutes, such as the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1972114 and the Clean Air Act, 115 expressly provide
for "technology-forcing." This may appear as a requirement for the
agency to set performance standards without regard to technical or
economic feasibility, or for the agency to use "best available" technology. Agencies subject to such mandates have responded by
adopting new and sometimes unproven technical methods which
are "available," by adapting techniques from other fields or by developing their own new techniques. 1 16
The analogue to pollution control "technology" is flood control
predictive "accuracy." The analogy, though, exists in logic but not
in life. That is, the NFIA is not "accuracy-forcing," though if it
were, flood control might more readily work.
Simply put, the NFIA does not create "accuracy-forcing" pressure because the Agency is not required to consider or adopt innovations in survey method. Instead, the NFIA demands that FIS
findings be not scientifically or technically incorrect. The Act establishes procedures to assure that allegedly better data and analytical
methods are brought to the attention of the Agency by aggrieved
parties.
The NFIA approach is designed to foster agency mastery of technical questions on a site-specific, local basis. However, the success
of this strategy is dependent on the perseverance, resources and
technical information available to those aggrieved by an FIS, since
the statute does not impose on the Agency itself any broad affirmative duty to improve its methodologies and data on its own initiative.
The statute does not, for example, establish any timetables or
other mandatory requirements for the Agency to deal with certain
types of technical uncertainty, as does the Clean Air Act. 1 17 Nor
does it require the Agency to use "best available" or "best practicable" techniques, as required by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972.118 Certainly it does not affirmatively require com114. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977 & Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. III
1979).
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 1 1977 & Supp. 11 1978).
116. La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771 (1977). See also Note, Forcing Technology: The Clean Air
Act Experience, 88 YALE L.J. 1713 (1979).
117. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409-7411 (Supp. 1 1977 & Supp. 11 1978).
118. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A), 1311(b)(1)(B) (1976).
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pletely accurate determinations, or total or even partial but specific
prevention of risk, as required by the Delaney Clause of the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act. 119
The statute requires only that FIS results be "not incorrect."
This translates to the minimum requirement that the Agency seek
methods of greater predictive accuracy only when (1) such improved methods have been accepted by the relevant profession,
and (2) the use of such improved methods has demonstrated that
prior methods yield incorrect results. The requirement of professional acceptance typifies the approach of this statute with regard
to methodological innovation: its innate conservatism is accuracyrestraining rather than accuracy-forcing.
This, too, suggests the need for objective agency criteria for
commencement of restudy and for adoption of new study methods.
Structuring Agency Initiatives

B.
1.

Affirmative Criteria

From the perspective of caseload management, determination of
the need for restudy could usefully be instituted during internal review, wherein agency personnel seek to resolve potential problems, rather than waiting until community or individual challenges
are filed. Members of FEMA's staff have drafted policies and sets
of criteria for this purpose, 120 but FEMA has not conclusively cho119. 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(c)(3)(A), 360b(d)(1)(H), 376(b)(5)(B) (1976).
120. For example, one such proposal stated:
In establishing priorities, the following criteria should be considered when a
community is being evaluated for restudy.
-development-is there pressure for development in the flood prone areas?
-physical changes-is the request for restudy based on significant physical
changes or simply a reanalysis of the watershed hydrology?
-recent flood-has a recent major flooding event occurred which indicated a
need for re-evaluation of the base flood evaluations?
-length
of available record-if a lengthy historical record was available
when the initial study was performed, the new information may not have a
significant impact.
in base flood elevations-if the physical changes or hydrologic
-difference
reanalysis (presently available data) would result in a change in the base
flood elevation of lass than one foot, we would not consider performing a
restudy. The impact of establishing these criteria is that there will be some
base flood elevation differences at contiguous community boundaries.
Memorandum from Richard W. Krimm, Assistant Administrator for Flood Insurance,
IF, to Federal Insurance Administration Regional Directors (March 13, 1978) (copy
on file at the offices of Bracken & Baram).
Nevertheless, FEMA staff continue to question whether the current system, which
incorporates relatively subjective evaluations of various criteria, is any less effective
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sen any by promulgating regulations or decision standards. 12 1
One FEMA contractor, Anderson-Nichols & Co., suggests that
the primary criteria for restudy should include extension of study
areas, revision of base data, and update of prior studies due to improved methods. Each of these would be arguably more objective
than the community acceptance criteria noted above, and
Anderson-Nichols has developed "measurable factors for identifying
restudy need" under its criteria. The factors could be used,
Anderson-Nichols suggests, to evaluate where the need for restudy
is most acute. They include: (1) changes in land use affecting flow,
e.g., changes in population, building permits, land annexations,
and major construction; (2) requests from the field from staff inspectors and citizens; and (3) changes in flow magnitude and frequency (per stream gauge records). 122 These factors address two of
the three restudy criteria suggested by Anderson-Nichols. With respect to the third, Anderson-Nichols suggests regular internal re3
views (e.g., every five or ten years).12
than a highly structured decision-making process which relies on specific data elements and fairly rigid decision criteria.
121. A proposed regulation was drafted for internal review, but was never officially released in accordance with APA requirements for rule-making:
§ 1915.7 Revision of Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMS). When the Administrator publishes a final flood elevation determination under the provisions of
Part 1917 of this subchapter, this determination is considered the regulatory
flood elevation(s) for at least 10 years from the date of the determination. It is
possible that communities may have different established flood elevations at
their contiguous boundaries, but as a matter of policy the Administrator will not
modify flood elevations unless:
(a) significant physical changes in the basin or flood. plain have substantially
altered the flood elevations; or
(b) a simulated model or other detailed flood elevation study prepared at the
community's expense has provided adequate data to determine what the
revised flood elevations should be; or
(c) a significant number of flood insurance claims have been paid for properties located outside the special hazard area.
The depiction of the flood elevations on the Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM)
may be made more accurate, however, if more detailed topographic information
becomes available.
122. Issue Paper on Riverine Flood Insurance Restudies (May 25, 1979).
123. Id. FEMA's staff has been especially concerned about conducting a restudy
merely because there have been detectable changes in discharges: "[i]f the discharges used in the Flood Insurance Study are not significantly different statistically
[from] the revised discharges, FIA should not conduct a restudy or issue revised
maps. This policy should apply broadly to all situations where claims or revised hydrology are submitted as cause for appeal or restudy." Memorandum from Brian
Mrazik, IFE, to Charles A. Lindsey, Studies Supervisor, IFE (June 11, 1976) (copy
on file at the offices of Bracken & Baram).
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In the same issue paper, Anderson-Nichols also developed several criteria for evaluating new study methods available for incorporation into FISs. These criteria include: accuracy; time and cost;
the legal defensibility of the study results; whether the method adequately responds to the needs and requirements of users of FIS
data; and whether the method is likely to give rise to the need to
restudy in the short- or medium-term future. Neither these
evaluative criteria, nor other possible criteria such as damage
claims made, are reflected in present FEMA regulations or interpretive guidelines. Without passing judgment on the AndersonNichols suggestions, criteria of an objective nature would be
useful.
2. Restrictive Criteria: Regulatory Impact
There are significant practical reasons why FEMA seeks to restrict the extensive rule-making processes necessary to improve
FIS results. Most importantly, a "better" FIS can nearly always be
produced at some increased cost. Agency resources are not unlimited, however, and only a fraction of the possible studies can be financed.
The policy of examining the effectiveness of a rule-making activity. before adopting a new rule is reflected in President Reagan's
Executive Order 12,291.124 That order calls on executive agencies
to conduct a "regulatory impact analysis" prior to promulgating a
"major rule."1 25 Such an analysis, at a minimum, must include:
1) A description of the potential benefits of the rule, including
any beneficial effects that cannot be quantified in monetary
terms, and the identification of those likely to receive the
benefits;
2) A description of the potential costs of the rule, including any
adverse effects that cannot be quantified in monetary terms,
and the identification of those likely to bear the costs;
3) A determination of the potential net benefits of the rule,
124. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981) (to be codified in 3 C.F.R.). For a description of
FEMA procedures for adopting rules in accordance with the Executive Order, see 46
Fed. Reg. 32,583 (1981) (to be codified in 44 C.F.R. § 1).
125. A "major rule" is any regulation likely to result in:
(1) An annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.
(2) A major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, State, or local government agencies, or geographic regions; or
(3) Significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United States-based enterprises to compete
with foreign-based enterprises in domestic or export markets.
46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981) (emphasis added).
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including an evaluation of effects that cannot be quantified in
monetary terms;
4) A description of alternative approaches that could substantially achieve the same regulatory goal at lower cost, together
with an analysis of this potential benefit and costs and a brief
explanation of the legal reasons why such alternatives, if proposed, could not be adopted; and
5) Unless covered by the description required under paragraph
4 of this subsection, an explanation of any legal reasons why
the rule cannot be based on the requirements set forth in

Section 2 of this Order. 126

Similar requirements existed under the Carter Administration's
Executive Order 12,044.127 In practice, those requirements led the
agencies to conduct formal cost-benefit analyses, as a part of their
rule-making procedures.
As a matter of law, the Reagan regulatory impact evaluation
probably need not be made before restudy or adoption of new FIS
methodology. That is, Executive Order 12,291 is not binding upon
"independent" agencies such as FEMA but only upon depart28
ments of the Executive Branch.1
There are, as well, a number of policy grounds to refrain from
the regulatory impact evaluation. The cost-benefit analysis is methodologically imprecise in the valuation of life, health, property and
126. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193-94 (1981). Section 2 of the Order states:
In promulgating new regulations, reviewing existing regulations, and developing
legislative proposals concerning regulation, all agencies, to the extent permitted
by law shall adhere to the following requirements:
(a) Administrative decisions shall be based on adequate information concerning the need for and consequences of proposed government action;
(b) Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to
society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society;
(c) Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to society;
(d) Among alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective, the
alternative involving the least net cost to society shall be chosen; and
(e) Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with the aim of maximizing the aggregate net benefits to society, taking into account the condition of the particular industries affected by regulations, the condition of the national
economy, and other regulatory actions contemplated for the future."
id.
127. 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978). For extensive discussion, see Baram, CostBenefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety, and Environmental
Regulatory Decisionmaking, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 473 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Baram].
128. See Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 234-36 (8th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976); Nat'l Renderers Ass'n v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1281
(8th Cir. 1976).
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various amenities, and the discounting of future costs and benefits. 129 Other major questions are whether the Agency should
routinely conduct such analyses when (1) they would involve large
commitments of agency personnel and funds; (2) they would slow
the pace of overall NFIP progress; and (3) they would highlight
certain methodological issues, such as how to value the
unquantifiable attributes of its intended actions and how to discount future costs and benefits.
A final problem for FEMA is that its statutory mandate will not
permit "scientifically or technically incorrect" elevation findings.
Any balancing between assuring "correctness" and minimizing economic impacts would tend to weaken the defensibility of elevation
determinations when challenged by aggrieved parties. Evidence
that economic tradeoffs were made in selecting the FIS methods
employed could be used to demonstrate that the Agency deviated
from its major objective of making its FIS actions scientifically or
technically correct.
Nevertheless, it would obviously be unwise for the Agency blatantly to disregard either economic considerations or its statutory
authority, and the burden of developing some sort of practical accommodation now rests with the Agency. A review of the NFIA indicates that the Agency's actions are to be grounded in considerations of "feasibility"' 3 0 as well as scientific or technical correctness.
Since the feasibility criterion has usually been construed under
other statutes to allow consideration of economic factors, 3 1x it appears that FEMA is permitted by the NFIA to conduct and use
regulatory impact analyses in its decision processes.
Whatever accommodation is made, FEMA needs to structure its
decision-making with respect to restudies and methodological im132
provements.
129. Baram, supra note 127, at 481-82.
130. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4012(b) (1976).
131. For an extreme and controversial case, see Am. Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA,
581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Indus. Union Dep't AFL-CIO v. Am.
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). But see Am. Textile Mfg. Inst., Inc. v.
Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981).
132. Three studies deserve consideration as to policy guidance for "good benefits
program practices:" Gilhooley, Standards and Proceduresfor the Discretionary Distribution of FederalAssistance, in 3 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 422 (1974); Kurzman, Uniform Minimum
Proceduresfor Agencies Administering Grant Programs, in 2 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED

Mashaw, supra note 4.

STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS

181 (1970);
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CONCLUSION

The National Flood Insurance Program has since its creation in
1968 exerted a constructive influence on flood risk management
and insurance across the United States. But the program, having financed 16,500 studies of local land use in floodplains, now is beset
by growing pains. Changes in topography, innovations in flood
study methods, and the imprecision inherent in measuring an environment in flux, all operate to strain the reliability of completed
studies.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency has, by regulation, set up workable administrative appeal procedures for individuals to obtain redress of grievances. Once those remedies are exhausted, an individual or his community has additional recourse to
the courts by virtue of established statutory and constitutional
standards for judicial review. But neither of these avenues offers
clear guidance as to when isolated defects in a community-wide
study become so weighty as to justify a comprehensive new study
by the Agency. The Agency's own regulations likewise are devoid
of clear criteria for restudy. Moreover, the Agency's enabling legislation tends not to encourage innovation in study methodology.
This article proposes that criteria be articulated to govern the
Agency's discretion to restudy or adopt new study methods. The
existence of such articulated criteria and a structure for applying
them would enhance the clarity and acceptability of FEMA's decisions on whether to restudy or to adopt a particular methodological
innovation. A structured decision process would also likely improve
the cost-effectiveness of the Agency's program and result in a
greater degree of accountability and predictability to the public.

